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Abstract-Increasingly we wish to ask and research questions 
about the adoption of interorganizational systems and 
electronic commerce at the industry level but are hampered by 
the lack of a theory of concerted purposeful action at this large 
level of analysis. In this paper we give the outlines of such a 
theory and indicate the uses to which it can be put. Particular 
attention is paid to how the routine day-to-day activities of the 
firms and support organizations that make up an industry 
group can be coordinated in such a way that we can speak of an 
industry as engaged in purposeful activity. We contend that 
only through a deep understanding of the possibilities and 
nature of routine coordinated activity at this level can issues 
concerning promotion, implementation and adoption of 
interorganizational systems by whole industries be properly 
framed.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
At this stage of maturity of inerorganizational systems 
(IOS) and electronic commerce (EC) research, one would 
like to ask questions such as: Why have certain industries 
been able to adopt electronic commerce technologies to 
reform supply chain management while others have not? 
What conditions within an industry particularly favour 
adoption of EC? What are the points of leverage that can be 
exploited to help an industry in the introduction of EC? Yet 
when we try to turn such questions into research agendas we 
are hampered by the lack of theory that can account for 
action at this broad level of analysis. Interorganizational 
systems research has dealt with the issues that arise when 
systems cross corporate boundaries, the difficulties of 
partnerships, and so forth, but has tended to focus on a 
limited scope of interorganizational interactions, often pair-
wise. But what the above questions demand is a theory of the 
concerted activity of a large group of firms and support 
organizations, which includes firms in the direct value 
chains, infrastructure providers, regulators, and trade 
organizations, who have a business interaction focussed on a 
particular product. 
Discussing purposeful activity at the industry level 
presents some new theoretical challenges. Although the 
practice has been criticised [1], in the case of organizational 
activity it is to some extent possible to associate 
organizational intentions with those of a powerful individual 
such as the CEO and to assert that such a person’s view of 
activity can act as a shared view for the organization. Given 
the discrete corporate identities of the players at the industry 
level, it is much more difficult to assert that any player’s 
intentions and visions stand for those of the industry group 
as a whole or that day-to-day practices of individual 
organizations are in any simple sense mediated by such 
shared goals and visions. In addition, the organizational 
group, is at least in principle constituted, to cooperate in the 
achievement of the focal task as a way of achieving certain 
economies of scale, whereas, in free market economies the 
fundamental interaction of companies is competition. These 
considerations demand more careful attention to the 
possibility and nature of concerted purposeful activity at this 
large unit of analysis. 
In this paper we make a start at constructing such a theory 
of industry-level activity, with the ultimate objective of  
explaining the diffusion, adoption and operation of supply 
chain electronic commerce technologies. Space only allows a 
theoretic exposition: early application of the theory can be 
found elsewhere [2-4]. We want to make as explicit as 
possible what the commitments of the theory are and why 
they have been made. Thus, the method we have chosen is to 
use the meta-theoretical framework put forward by Markus 
and Robey [5] to discuss theories of the impact of IS upon 
organizational change. This allows us to be quite explicit 
about the logical structure of the theory, its units of analysis 
and our position on causal agency. The commitments we 
make are similar to those implicit in Gidden’s structuration 
theory which has become popular recently for discussing 
implementation of information systems [6-8], but there are 
important differences. In fact, the theory we present can be 
thought of as a structuration-like theory applied to 
organizations as actors within an industry group. 
II. CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY 
Markus and Robey [5] present a meta-theory of theories of 
information systems and technology driven change in 
organizations in which they define three principle 
dimensions of causal structure of such theories. They are: 
1) Causal agency: which “refers to the analyst’s beliefs 
about the identity of the causal agent, the nature of causal 
action and the direction of causal influences among the 
elements in the theory”, [5, p585]. They distinguish between 
types of theories where the locus of causation is the 
(technological) environment or situation, the focal agent, or 
the interaction between environment and agent. 
2) Logical structure: which refers to the degree of 
extension in time of the relations between cause and effect. 
 They distinguish between variance theories (also more 
recently called factors theories) which are “concerned with 
predicting levels of outcome from levels of contemporaneous 
predictor variables” [5, p589], and process theories where 
outcomes are assumed to be more properly determined by the 
nature of processes that occur over the duration of the 
change episode. 
3) Level of analysis: which refers to the type of social 
entities (individuals, organizations, society, or a mixture of 
these), which are the main concern of the theory and form 
the atomic analytical units of the theory. 
The theory put forward here is explicitly a multi-level, 
interactional, process theory. These commitments are very 
much interconnected and are elaborated in the following 
sections. These dimensional settings essentially define the 
theory as being of a certain generic type. We will also need 
to specify an additional set of commitments concerning the 
nature of activity that define it as a particular theory. 
A. Levels of analysis: analytical units 
Since our goal is a theory of the intentional activity of 
industries, our primary unit of analysis is the industry group. 
We make the usual split between this unit as a focal actor 
and its environment. However, to explain concerted activity 
at the industry level we find it necessary to speak of the 
situated actions of individual members of this group and how 
these become coordinated. Therefore, we must include 
individual firms and organizations as lower level actors in 
the analysis. Again we make the split between these actors 
and their environment and find that the latter consists of the 
broader industry environment plus a more immediate 
environment consisting of the industry as a whole. We are 
thus led to a rather unusual three level theory. These 
analytical constructs are defined thus: 
1) Individual industry units. These are the firms and 
organizations that contribute to the operations of the 
industry. Examples are: firms directly associated with the 
value chain of the product specific to the industry, that is, 
manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers; 
infrastructure providers such as transport providers, financial 
institutions, software providers, and communications 
providers such as VANs; regulatory organizations such as 
trade organizations, standards bodies, and industry related 
research organizations. These firms and other organizational 
entities are the smallest grain-size entities of the theory. We 
consider actions and intentions to be attributable to the units 
rather than to particular persons in them;  
2) The industry group itself. This consists of the 
individual industry units plus the system of relations between 
them. These relations, which will be described in more detail 
below, are what makes the collection of units greater than 
the sum of its parts, and therefore worth speaking about as 
an entity to which coordinated activity can be attributed. An 
important challenge of the theory is to show how industry 
group action is related to industry unit activity. Since we 
have included not just the firms directly adding value to the 
focal product of the industry but also any other organizations 
supporting these activities, our notion of industry group is 
rather similar to Porter’s notion of “industry cluster” [9]. 
This industry group is also the immediate environment of 
the individual units; 
3) The remote environment. This consists of all firms, 
organization, institutions, and other factors at a larger scale 
than the industry, that affect the firms and organizations of 
the industry and the relations between them. Examples are: 
government policies, economic conditions, competing 
industries, foreign exchange rates, foreign competition, 
technological change, physical environment and geography.  
The distinction between the immediate unit environment 
and the remote extra-industry environment needs some 
clarification. The defining characteristic of the remote 
environment is that although it constrains and enable certain 
actions of the industry units, these characteristics are not 
substantially affected by the actions of these units acting 
individually or in consort. An example is the appearance of 
the Internet as a communication technology. Although this 
has had a great effect on the practicality of EDI in certain 
industries [10], it would be hard to argue that the actions of 
any specific industry grouping have shaped the nature of the 
core design and protocols of the Internet. Such shaping 
forces occur at a larger scale than particular industries. 
Another example is government policy which, in the case of 
the Australian automotive industry, has had profound effects 
on its adoption of EDI [11]. But these policies were largely 
shaped by events on the international scale and by ideologies 
not derived from the automotive industry itself. Finally, the 
physical environment of the industry shapes what can be 
done in that industry. For instance, the feasibility of Just-In-
Time delivery is affected by geographical remoteness, but is 
hardly influenced by the industry itself.  
By contrast the immediate environment, what is taken to 
be the industry at large, is defined here to be all those firms 
and organizations whose actions both enable and constrain 
the actions of individual firms but are also themselves 
influenced by the industry units through mutual interaction. 
We will explore the detailed nature of this interaction in later 
sections. For example, while the nature of the Internet at the 
large scale is not substantially a response to the needs of 
particular firms or industries, these needs, and the business 
opportunities they afford, have directly given rise to certain 
Internet-based EDI software products [2,10,12]. So such 
software providers have an effect on the activities of industry 
firms and are also affected by these activities. Thus they 
must be considered to be within the immediate environment 
of the industry units as defined above, and also to be units of 
the broader industry group. The defining characteristic of the 
industry group, and thus the immediate environment of the 
units, that we have in mind is this mutual interaction of all 
the parts, that is, a certain kind of closure by virtue of the 
 fact that most of the organizations with which any one 
organization interacts are also part of the group. 
There are some definite assumptions being made here 
which should be made explicit. By associating the immediate 
environment of individual firms with the group of mutually 
interacting units we have assumed that this group of actors 
and their interactions essentially constitutes the industry. 
There may well be other types of entities that must be 
included in a full inventory of the potential influences upon 
the actions of units but are not industry units as defined. The 
nature of the focal product of the industry, for instance the 
need to keep meat refrigerated, might be an example. The 
assumption that what happens in some domain can be 
explained in terms of the interaction between actors only, is 
a consequence of trying to describe the world in intentional 
terms, and it is not obvious that everything in the world can 
be conceived of as an actor (cf. actor network theory [13]). 
Structuration theory also suffers this problem and it is hard 
to incorporate the aspects of the world that are not social in 
that theory. We have included in the theory a richer mix of 
entities in what we term the remote environment partly to 
overcome this problem. This is possible because of the more 
passive role attributed to the remote environment. 
In addition the boundary between the industry group and 
its remote environment is somewhat fuzzy. Certain 
infrastructure providers and standards organizations might 
not be entirely specific to any industry and yet they are 
sufficiently influenced by the interests of individual 
industries to be considered at least partly within its 
boundary. Within the industry group itself there my be units 
that deal with the focal product that are so individualistic or 
monopolistic that they can hardly be said to be in interaction 
with the rest of the industry. There may be units that are so 
powerful or so weak that their interaction with other units is 
hardly reciprocal. There will also be units whose interaction 
with each other is constrained by corporate ties and vertical 
integration, such as the distribution and retail functions of 
large supermarket chains, so what constitutes the actual 
atomic units of the theory may be open to discussion. 
Nevertheless, we press ahead with the somewhat simplistic 
model of the domain of industry-level activity presented 
above, because we are primarily trying to articulate a 
conception of how activity at the industry level is related to 
activity at the unit level and the consequences of this. 
Whether such a model is rich enough to account for all 
industry activity phenomena is an empirical question for 
future research. 
B. Causal agency 
We take the position that the actions of the industry units 
are both constrained and enabled by the existence of certain 
relations between them which form the structure of the 
immediate industry environment. This notion of structure 
plays a similar role in our theory to that of structure in 
structuration theory, but is rather more concrete than 
Gidden’s ‘rules and resources’ which ‘exist only as memory 
traces’ and are ‘instanciated in action’ [14, p377]. Since this 
industry structure is in turn the product of the actions of 
individual units, actions of the individual units and of the 
industry as a group are mutually determining. Thus, 
individual units are neither entirely unconstrained by the 
industry as immediate environment, nor entirely subsumed 
by the industry group as a focal actor. Thus the locus of 
causal agency within the industry group is the interaction 
between the activities of the individual units and the 
networks of relations among the group (its structure). Causal 
agency is thus of the emergent type defined by Markus and 
Robey. However, because we allow for the existence of a 
remote environment whose influence on the industry units is 
essentially one way, we allow the possibility that activity of 
the industry is to some extent technologically (or more 
properly environmentally) determined in Markus and 
Robey’s sense (for instance, as in the case of EDI in the 
Australian Automotive industry mentioned above). However, 
any such determinism is likely to be less linear than in the 
simple technologically determinist theories described by 
those authors, because the effect of technology on individual 
firms in our theory is most likely somewhat indirect via the 
effect it has on the nature of possible relations between units 
(industry structure).  
C. Logical structure 
We now take a position on the nature of activity at the 
individual and group level which defines the logical 
structure of our theory as processual in Markus and Robey’s 
classification. We assume that what happens at both a unit 
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Fig. 1: The focal industry unit acts in an environment of 
the structures of the industry group plus remote influences. 
  
 and group level is detectable as patterns of coordinated 
behaviour of units that are reproduced over time. Rather than 
the trajectory of industry activity being determined at any 
time by the action of a set of environmental or other factors, 
we argue that this trajectory is one that is simultaneously 
consistent with the constraints imposed by the structure of 
immediate and remote environment and with the principle 
that this trajectory of activities is what actually constitutes 
the industry structure itself. Thus, in both times of stability 
and times of change such a trajectory will be difficult to 
predict from preceding conditions and understanding the 
conditions of its reproduction will require a deep analysis of 
the mutual reinforcement of the structure of industry 
relations and their interaction with the actions of individual 
units over space and time, that is, a processual analysis [15]. 
To describe in more detail our conception of the principle 
of reproduction of inter-organizational activity we need to go 
more deeply into the nature of industry level structure and 
our particular notion of situated action. This takes the 
discussion beyond the generic classification of the type of 
theory we propose, to the specific dynamic commitments of 
the theory.  
III. DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRY-LEVEL ACTIVITY 
A. Theory of Activity 
To flesh out the dynamical structure of the theory we now 
need to take a position on the nature of on-going intentional 
or goal directed activity in complex systems. Such positions 
have been termed theories of activity by Agre [16,17]. (This 
terminology should not be confused with Russian Activity 
Theory [18]). A number of author’s [16,17,19-23] from 
diverse disciplines have pointed out recently that there are 
essential two choices for a theory of activity of intentional 
systems: representational / information-processing theories 
of activity, and situational / interactional theories of activity. 
In the first kind it is assumed that the focal agent (which 
would in our case would be the industry) can act in its 
environment to achieve desired goal states by means of the 
construction and maintenance of a symbolic, abstract 
representation of its environment and its state within it, 
using data acquired by sensing the environment, and can 
determine a series of formal actions capable of taking it from 
its current state to the desired state by a process of logical 
deduction upon this abstract representation of the world of 
action. This series of formal actions is a plan, which is then 
implemented in the real world.  
Applied to our problem this would require the industry as 
a group to be able to construct and share a central and 
common representation of its position as a group with 
respect to its environment, and to be able to use this shared 
representation to deduce and implement an agreed set of 
coordinated actions. This vision of industry-level activity, as 
with all applications of this type of plan-based activity 
theory, would be based on a metaphor of the industry acting 
as a conscious, deliberative agent, and is implicit in many 
project management approaches to industry reform. We 
argue that, although such plan-based, deliberative activity 
can be organised on rare occasions, it is quite implausible 
that ongoing, day-to-day activities of industry units are 
coordinated in this way by reference to a shared 
representation of their joint intentions and actions. Thus 
while acknowledging the possibility of planned industry 
action we seek an alternative explanation of how coordinated 
goal-directed actions of industry units occur and are 
maintained on an ongoing basis that does not rely on shared 
plans.  
The second type of theory of activity imagines a focal 
agent with simple, possibly purely reactive, responses to its 
environmental situation, acting in an environment that is 
structured in such a way as to tend to enable certain goal 
outcomes. These outcomes are then as much attributable to 
the structure of its environment as to the actions of the focal 
agent. In these theories the focal agent is not required to be 
capable of forming an ”aerial view” of its relation to the 
environment, but instead acts on the basis of its direct 
perceptions of the environment from its particular situated 
“ground view”, and can act with distinctly bounded formal 
reasoning powers because the structure of the environment 
assumes some of the “cognitive burden” of intentional action 
[24,25]. Activity is an interaction between the situated 
responses of the focal agent and the structure of the 
environment in which it acts, and goal achievement is 
emergent from this interaction. The metaphor that 
encapsulates this type of activity is that of routine behaviour 
in familiar situations. Routines [26] are simple actions that 
are both triggered by situations and supported in their goal 
achievement by the recurring structure of situations that 
elicit them. 
We take this type of theory of activity to be the likely 
mechanism of ongoing, routinized industry-level activity. 
Applied to our problem, we see the trajectory of action of the 
collection of individual units, that is activity at the industry 
group level, as composed of a collection of relatively simple, 
myopic, situated responses of individual units to their 
immediately perceived environment. However, this 
environment consists both of the remote uninfluenced 
environment and the immediate environment consisting of 
the network of relations among the units. In such a theory it 
is because the immediate environment is reciprocally 
determined by the actions of individual units that the 
collective trajectory of actions of the units can be said to be 
the activity of the industry group. In other words, concerted 
activity is attributed to the reciprocal causal effect of the 
group upon individual units, rather than to any form of 
regular group deliberation about action. We must now 
elaborate on the types of structural relationships that can 
occur in the industry and the way they might enable and 
 constrain the individual situated actions of the units 
themselves.  
B. Industry Structure 
Relations between industry units are influences of one 
firm upon another that cause their actions to be correlated or 
coordinated. Defining all such relationships between firms at 
any time would define the structure of the industry. There 
are a number of different types of relations and not all 
individual units or types of units are involved in every type 
of relation. These include: 
1. Trading relations or relations that centre on adding 
value to the industry’s focal products. Essentially, one 
industry unit is a supplier of goods in such a relation and the 
other is a customer. Mapping these pair-wise relations 
defines the supply or value chains of the industry. 
2. Communicative relations. Units transmit information 
concerning actual or planned trading events to certain other 
units in order to coordinate action.  
3. Economic Relationships. There are a number of 
possible economic relations between units: 
Competition. Individual industry units compete with other 
units for customers or suppliers; 
Cooperation. Individual units cooperate with some units 
against other units, or to reduce the bargaining power of 
customers or suppliers; 
Intermediation. Some units intermediate between supplier 
and customer. There are trading intermediaries and 
infrastructure intermediaries. Trading intermediaries add 
value by transforming the product (manufacturers) or by 
reducing the cost and risk of trading (distributors, 
wholesalers). Infrastructure intermediaries (eg. VANs) 
reduce infrastructure costs and risk for firms. 
4. Corporate Relationships. The behaviour of units may be 
coordinated by being part of the same corporate entity and 
subject to its management control. For instance distribution 
and retailing, which we would consider to be separate 
functions or units of the retail supply chain, are often 
combined in supermarket operations. Similarly, units may be 
vertically integrated hierarchically. In either case, economic 
and power relations will be of a different type and strength 
than for units in free market relationships. 
5. Power Relations Certain firms can influence the 
behaviour of other firms by threats or sanctions. Such 
dominance may be based on size, degree of connectedness 
with other units, security of value adding niche, and so forth. 
Trust, which is often talked about in the context of 
interorganizational systems [27], is part of this dimension. 
6. Cultural, Normative, or Sense-Making Relations. Firms 
are influenced by other firms through appeals to notions of 
“good practice”. The influence may be tacitly shared or 
formalised by certain regulatory units, such as industry 
funded trade bodies or communications standards bodies. 
7. Geographical and other physical relations. 
Geographical connectivity and proximity is particularly 
pertinent to interorganizational reforms in the distribution of 
material products, such as Just-In-Time replenishment. 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to 
present the richness of the relations that exist between the 
individuals of a broader industry group. The mapping of the 
particular relations present in a particular industry, and their 
strengths, would be an important part of understanding 
industry-level activity in that industry.  
C. Reciprocity of Industry Group Structure and Unit Activity 
The activities of individual industry units are both 
constrained and enabled by the structure of relations that 
exists in the industry. For example, compliance to 
communicative standards with other units (a cultural 
relationship) enables open entry by firms into the 
communication network, but constrains the use or 
development of new or individual types of communications 
by the firm, which may be important to competitive 
advantage.  
Conversely, the structure of the relationships that exists in 
the industry is constructed from the actions of the individual 
industry units. For example, adoption of proprietary 
communications standards by a firm compromises 
communicative relationships. Communication between firms 
may alter power relationships. Adherence to standards 
entrenches the power of infrastructure intermediaries. 
D. Reproduction of the Structure of Industries 
Our main contention about the dynamics of industry-level 
activity is that certain types of structural relations tend to be 
reproduced as a result of the way they constrain and enable 
the situated actions of the individual units. If the group 
structural relations created by the situated actions of 
individual units are consistent with the possibility of the 
individual firms performing these actions without undue 
recourse to deliberative planning, then both the structure and 
the individual actions will tend to be reproduced over time 
and more easily become routinized. This explanation of 
group concerted action does not need to appeal to the sort of 
explicit deliberative coordination envisioned by 
representational type theories of activity, and is more 
consistent with the situated capacities of individual units to 
act. 
The unfolding of the trajectory of the actions of the 
industry units is thus a complex interplay of interactions of 
the units with the immediate and remote environment and 
the tendency of these actions to confirm and reproduce the 
structure of the immediate industry group environment. 
Whether this trajectory of action actually fulfils goals 
deliberately aimed for by individual units or groups of units, 
or by trade organization that purport to represent the interest 
 of industries as a whole, is thus an emergent rather than 
planned phenomenon under this theory. Goal attaining 
industry group behaviour is largely achieved by evolution in 
this theory and is explained by the history of unit-group / 
structure interactions over time.  
There are a number of ways that “desirable” coordinated 
industry unit action can be acquired. Industry structures that 
benefit individual units, especially powerful ones, tend to be 
confirmed and reproduced. Episodes of coordinated group 
deliberative action are possible as a way of redirecting group 
action trajectories, but the maintenance of the new trajectory 
depends on the mutual reproduction of new industry 
structures by the new possibilities they afford for situated 
actions of individual firms. Because of the proposed myopic, 
self-satisficing nature of normal on-going unit action, certain 
trajectories of group action which may appear highly 
desirable to a hypothetical observer, freed from the network 
of interests of the group members, for instance ones that 
lower total operating cost substantially through coordinated 
group activity, may be difficult to acquire and reproduce as 
routine. This is because according to this theory such a 
transcendental, “aerial view” of activity is not generally 
available to the industry as a group, and is not part of the 
principle of reproduction of group activity. It is even possible 
that individual activity that is dysfunctional for group 
survival could be reproduced for a while. However, 
perception of a threat of extinction by units or groups of 
units would be a powerful means by which situated firm 
actions could be changed in such a way as to disconfirm such 
dysfunctional industry structure and result in the evolution of 
new structure. 
The prospect for desirable change is not as dismal as it 
may seem from the above description. An important feature 
of the kind of routinized, situated activity envisioned here is 
its robustness. This allows for incremental changes to be 
adopted and routinized and to then form the basis of more 
ambitious changes in a bottom-up fashion. In terms of 
planned change, such an image of incremental routine-
stabilised change holds out a promise for making better use 
of difficult deliberative action episodes than a notion of 
interorganizational change based entirely on deliberative 
planning. 
However, there is another important way in which 
industry structural relations can be altered leading to new 
action trajectories and states of industry coordination: this is 
through the effect of changes in the remote environment 
upon the viability of certain inter-unit relations. The threat of 
extinction by inter-industry or foreign competition has 
already been mentioned. Technological changes such as the 
appearance of the Internet or economic changes such as 
exchange rate shifts could so dramatically change the nature 
and viability of certain types of relations between firms that 
new trajectories of situated activity are reproduced by the 
changed structures. Changes in the remote environment may 
well be the most powerful causes of change in industry level 
behaviour, given the difficulty of on-going deliberative 
coordinated action, and may be a major opportunity for 
episodes of intervention. 
IV. DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
A. Implications for explanation of change 
The theory presented here has a number of important 
implications for the explanation of the nature of change and 
the feasibility of controlled change of industry level 
coordinated behaviour. Firstly, contrary to simplistic 
deterministic factors theories, there is no simple relationship 
in this theory between a set of environmental factors, which 
may include intervention strategy factors, and direct 
outcomes. The limited usefulness of factors approaches to 
explaining and controlling IS related change within single 
organizations is now recognised theoretically and 
empirically in the IS literature [5,6], and this work extends 
these conclusion to interorganizational change. In the kind 
of situational / interactional theory put forward here, the 
relationships between events in the environment and actions 
of individual units that may act as change agents, and their 
long term consequences is less easily predicted. On the one 
hand, the robustness of routinized situated activity tends to 
make industry practices resistant to perturbations. Thus the 
theory presented here gives hope of understanding the nature 
of the frequently discussed phenomenon of resistance to 
change and the possibility of more principled approaches to 
overcoming it. On the other hand the complex web of 
interactions including positive feedback loops implied by the 
theory can make outcomes sensitive to small changes: small 
changes in the remote environments or small deliberate 
change actions might produce large and largely 
unpredictable changes to practices.  
Secondly, the theory suggest that deliberative coordinated 
action by an industry as a whole, or units purporting to 
represent such a group position, may be severely limited in 
effectiveness, and this is certainly consistent with 
observation. The situation is even worse than that of change 
within a single organization because, while a powerful 
person such as the CEO of an organization might 
legitimately claim access to the kind of transcendental 
“aerial view” of action posited by planning approaches to 
change and be able to mobilise action of the basis of it, it is 
unlikely that any organization in an industry, including trade 
organizations, is sufficiently external to the power interests 
and cultural relations of the industry to make such a claim to 
an objective outside view. This is why the availability of such 
an industry wide representation is not part of the principle of 
reproduction of practices posited by this theory. On the other 
hand, as pointed out earlier, understanding the nature and 
robustness of situated routinized activity provides a 
theoretical basis for understanding controlled, incremental, 
bottom-up change and the changed role that deliberative 
planning might play in it.  
 B. Implications for understanding of adoption of 
interorganizational systems at an industry level. 
The theory has potential application in analysing the 
adoption or non-adoption of inter-organizational systems, 
such as supply chain electronic commerce and Just-In-Time 
replenishment, in whole industries. For instance, some 
industries have taken to the use of EDI more readily and 
achieved greater levels of EC-compliance than others. Why 
is this so? The theory suggest several possibilities. One is the 
importance of changes in the remote environment in 
destabilising existing industry structures and routines and 
creating the opportunity for new ones or the amplifying the 
effectiveness of deliberative intervention. The Button Plan to 
radically improve the efficiency of the Australian automotive 
industry led to profound changes in relations among players 
in that industry, including improved cooperation between 
assemblers and parts suppliers, creation and strengthening of 
trade bodies and normative links including a unique uniform 
industry-wide approach to EC, creation of a niche for a 
government VAN, and near 100% EDI compliance of all 
trading partners [11,28]. Similarly, the appearance of the 
Internet as a new communication technology with new 
forms-based communication protocols has assisted large 
players in the retail industry to achieve 100% compliance 
and consequent supply chain wide distribution reforms. One 
of us [2] has argued that this was not simply due to direct 
characteristics of the new technology, but rather to a 
profound reshaping of the relations between a number of 
parties involved, including traders, infrastructure providers 
and regulatory bodies, allowing a new vision to emerge of 
mixed traditional and radical types of EDI in a more 
comprehensive network of communicative relations between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated trading partners, and a 
new distribution of costs and benefits among them. By 
contrast, the routine situated activities of units in some 
industries, such as the Australian Meat Industry [3,4], may 
be such as to effectively reject the possibility of improvement 
through EC-coordinated activity. 
The essence of electronic EC-enabled interorganizational 
systems is that great efficiencies in the handling of materials 
can be achieved with low technology provided that the 
activities of participating organizations are coordinated 
through frequent, computer-to-computer communication. 
Achieving these high levels of coordination often requires 
some organization to incur extra costs, for instance by being 
prepared to handle smaller replenishment orders or 
becoming EDI-capable, or to assume greater risk by being 
prepared to operate with smaller buffer stocks. At the same 
time it is not clear that all parties will share equally the 
efficiencies achieved. Therefore, adoption of 
interorganizational systems usually involves renegotiation of 
trading arrangements to equalise the distribution of costs, 
benefits and risks between trading partners [29]. The present 
theory begins to explain why this is such a barrier to their 
adoption: the normal on-going activity of the industry does 
not make use of explicit representation of the overall 
industry practices upon which such negotiation might be 
based, so such representations or models have to be build in 
ad hoc episodes of concerted deliberation which are foreign 
to the normal modus operandi of the industry units. The 
severity of this barrier to industry wide reform is seen much 
more clearly from a situated action perspective than from 
naive positions that implicitly assume a representation theory 
of activity and conflate reasoning about action with action 
itself.  
C. Methodological implications for research 
The theory suggest that the appropriate way of studying 
the adoption of interorganizational changes within industries 
is to trace, by empirical research, the relations of various 
types that exist between the various types of individual units, 
the way in which these relations are constructed and 
maintained through the situated actions of the units, and the 
ways in which these structures together with remote 
environmental factors enable and constrain individual firm 
action and thus industry wide initiatives. Preliminary 
attempts to do this for diverse industries can be found in [2] 
and [3]. The theory presented here can thus act as a 
framework for principled analysis of case studies of 
interorganizational systems adoption. It can additionally 
provide a source of research agendas in much the same way 
as proposed by Orlakowski [6] for structuration theories of 
IS-enabled organizational change. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A number of important new ideas have been introduced in 
this paper. The first is simply the notion of using a whole 
industry as a unit of analysis in discussing EC adoption. 
While the diffusion of EC has been discussed previously, 
often the focus is on adoption by individual firms with the 
assumption that adoption by a critical mass of firms leads to 
industry wide adoption. The new focus on the industry as an 
actor raises the possibility of discussing industry 
characteristics that are favourable to EC adoption, or cross-
industry comparisons of EC adoption. The second is the 
provision of a framework for discussing the concerted action 
or agency of the industry group, with a specific proposal 
about how such concerted action can be related to the 
individual situated actions of the group members. Finally, 
the paper applies a structuration-like theoretical framework 
to a larger unit, the industry group, than has previously been 
done. 
The theory presented here came out of discussions about 
the different levels of uptake of EC technologies in different 
industries [4] and also from an analysis of the way the 
Internet has destabilised the traditional vision of EDI [2]. 
Many of the ideas are tentative and we need to analyse in 
detail the interactions and causal influences on firms that 
 exist in one or more industry sectors and verify that our 
theoretical constructs, particularly the division between 
immediate and remote environment, are adequate to explain 
the phenomena. This work is under way. 
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